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ABSTRACT
The Internal Protection Alternative ('IPA') stems from the premise that if there is a safe place within a refugee applicant's country of origin where he or she can relocate, the refugee definition is not engaged. Today, it is an inherent part of refugee status determinations in most States Parties of the 1951 Convention, and has been incorporated into Article 8 of the 2011 Recast EC Qualification Directive. The main thrust of the IPA test across various jurisdictions is that it must be reasonable, or put another way, it must not be unduly harsh.
The focus of this article, however, will be on the issue upon which states have diverged widely in their jurisprudence -the relevance and applicable standard of human rights considerations in determining the existence of an IPA.
First, this article examines the position advocated by the UNHCR that protection of basic civil, political and socio-economic rights is a core requirement of the IPA. Considering that those who return to their country and are forced to relocate to obtain protection are in effect, Internally Displaced Persons, this article then discusses the relevance of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement to the IPA inquiry. Thirdly, this article analyses the approach put forward by the Michigan Guidelines on the Internal Protection Alternative and approved in New Zealand, and fourthly, this article examines the approach which has been established in the jurisprudence of England and Wales. This article argues that in the context of the IPA inquiry human rights considerations must be taken into account insofar as protection of human rights forms an ingredient of effective protection from the persecution feared. In addition, human rights conditions in the IPA may be of relevance when considering the possibility of indirect refoulement. Aside from these two instances, expulsion to an IPA where human rights standards are generally low is outside of the scope of the Refugee Convention. Complementary protection, however, may preclude expulsion in this regard and it is by taking such an approach to the IFA inquiry that the distinction between refugee and humanitarian claims may be appropriately maintained. 3 the illegal drugs trade. 7 All participants in this study stated that even if their account of persecution is believed, the Home Office and immigration judiciary is generally unwilling, rather than unable, to recognize the potential harm that will arise if they are required to relocate internally. 8 The second study focuses on the current policy of the United Kingdom government of returning all Afghan asylum seekers to Kabul. In this sense, Kabul is seen as an IPA for those who originate from elsewhere in the country.
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Afghanistan's living standards are amongst the lowest in the world, where only 48 per cent have access to drinking water and 37 per cent have access to improved sanitation. 10 In Kabul, over 80 per cent of the population live in unplanned settlements, 11 where there is limited access to basic health services and food security and where deaths frequently occur in the harsh winter conditions. 12 Many of those who are sent back are unaccompanied teenagers, who face a significant risk of forced marriage and sexual abuse. 13 It is clear therefore, on the basis of these two studies that return to a so-called IPA may result in exposure to human rights violations. The relevance of human rights considerations in the IPA inquiry is far from certain, however. In particular, there is no clear consensus on whether the criterion of absence of persecution in itself suffices to constitute an IPA, whether a certain additional standard of human rights protection is required, and if so, what the applicable standard is.
In tacking this issue, this article sets out the IPA's relationship with the Refugee Convention before focusing on the relevance of human rights considerations (if any) in the IPA inquiry. Four different approaches are discussed in this regard. First, this article examines the position advocated by the UNHCR that protection of basic civil, political and socio-economic rights is a core requirement of the IPA. 14 Considering that those who return to their country and are forced to relocate to obtain protection are in effect, Internally
Displaced Persons ('IDPs'), this article then discusses the relevance of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement to the IPA inquiry. 15 Thirdly, this article analyses the approach put forward by the Michigan Guidelines on the Internal Protection Alternative and approved in New Zealand, 16 and fourthly, this article examines the approach which has been established in the jurisprudence of England and Wales. This article argues that the Refugee Convention ought to be interpreted in light of human rights considerations, however regard must be had to the clear limits the drafters placed on the text. In the context of the IPA inquiry, therefore, human rights considerations must be taken into account insofar as protection of human rights forms an ingredient of effective protection from the persecution feared. In addition, human rights conditions in the IPA may be of relevance when considering the possibility of indirect refoulement. Aside from these two instances, expulsion to an IPA where human rights standards are generally low is outside of the scope of the Refugee Convention.
Complementary protection, however, may preclude expulsion in this regard and it is by taking such an approach to the IFA inquiry that the distinction between refugee and humanitarian claims may be appropriately maintained.
NEXUS TO THE REFUGEE CONVENTION
International law 'has always been susceptible to the tyranny of phrases', 17 and the IPA concept is an example of such a phrase. It does not appear in the refugee definition and no explicit reference was made to its existence at the time of drafting. 18 Nonetheless, states have held that there exists a nexus between the IPA and the refugee definition in two main respects. The first is based on the definition's requirement that the fear must be 'wellfounded'. This has been interpreted to mean that the fear is not well-founded where the persecutory source of the fear could be avoided by relocating to a safe area within the country of origin. 19 The second basis for the IPA lies in the notion of 'protection.' 20 The focus of the refugee definition is not upon protection in a particular region, but upon the more general notion of protection by that country. 21 If within that country, obtaining its 'protection' is merely a question of relocating, it implies that inability or the unwillingness to return is for reasons extrinsic to those set out in the Refugee Convention and that the claimant is therefore not a refugee. The IPA, although not contained in the Refugee Convention, is thus based on the notion of 'surrogate' international refugee protection, which is an exception to the normal principle of international law that protection is usually the obligation of the country of nationality.
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PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PROPOSED INTERNAL FLIGHT ALTERNATIVE
There is ample scholarly opinion to the effect that the Refugee Convention is 'part and parcel' of the broader international human rights law framework. 23 Chetail, for example, posits that:
uman rights law has become the ultimate benchmark for determining who is a refugee. The authoritative intrusion of human rights has proved to be instrumental in infusing a common and dynamic understanding of the refugee definition that is more consonant with and loyal to the evolution of international law. It thus avoids the Geneva Convention to be a mere legal anachronism by adapting it to the changing realities of forced migrations.
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This argument finds its roots in the Convention's preamble, which should be taken into account when assessing the Convention's object and purpose. 25 The preamble shows that the However, a note of caution must be taken at this juncture, as the Refugee Convention's relationship with human rights is far from certain. In particular, it is unclear whether human rights law informs the interpretation of the Refugee Convention, or whether it has a more influential role in that it defines its parameters. It has been argued that the aim of the Refugee Convention is to provide international protection to a narrowly defined category of persons who can prove a well-founded fear of persecution for enumerated Convention reasons.
According to its drafters, the Refugee Convention's goal was not of protecting those in need of human rights protection generally but to deal 'only with the problem of legal protection and status. Thirdly, the Convention's applicability is limited by its exclusion and cessation clauses. Human rights lawyers tend to be 'suspicious' of such concepts of deserving and undeserving persons. 34 In light of these considerations, one must be mindful that there may be limits as to how far the Refugee Convention may be interpreted as a human rights convention.
This discussion sets the scene for the focus of this article -the relevance of human rights protection in the proposed IPA. This issue has been discussed in relation to the 'reasonableness' criterion of the proposed IPA, and as an independent criterion in its own right. The spectrum of positions on this matter is very broad, ranging from an insistence on protection of basic civil, political and socioeconomic rights, to the proposition that human rights considerations (persecution aside) are a neutral factor for the purposes of IPA determination. The following paragraphs will outline the differing stances that have been taken with a view to determining which of these, if any, is most compatible with the Refugee Convention. Even if a core human rights standard could be identified, it is doubtful that it would be an 'objective and apolitical yardstick' for measuring standards within the IPA as propounded by Towle. 44 The difficulty in measuring human rights standards in another jurisdiction is especially apparent in the realm of socioeconomic rights. Notwithstanding the fact that the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have identified a 'minimum core obligation' to ensure the satisfaction of rights incumbent on States Parties, 45 these rights have traditionally been seen as open-ended, indeterminate and lacking conceptual clarity.
The Refugee Convention as a Human Rights
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Furthermore, as the obligation on states is to 'take steps … to the maximum of its available resources with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised'
in the Convention it would be very difficult for a court to assess the situation in a foreign 40 jurisdiction. 47 It would have to adjust its expectations for each state owing to the fact that states enjoy different levels of development and therefore different levels of potential for the fulfilment of rights. 48 Furthermore it would mean that each IPA would be subjected to a different threshold of socioeconomic provision depending on the country in which the IPA is located. Far from being a universal standard, it would vary widely depending on the level of development in the state concerned.
Finally, the human rights approach has been rejected by the Court of Appeal in England and Wales. In the words of Lord Phillips MR:
An asylum-seeker who has no well-founded fear of persecution but has left his home country because he does not there enjoy [basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic human rights] will not be entitled to refugee status. When considering whether it is reasonable for an asylum seeker to relocate in a safe haven, in the sole context of considering whether he enjoys refugee status, we cannot see how the fact that he will not there enjoy the basic norms of civil, political and socio-economic rights will normally be relevant. If that is the position in the safe haven, it is likely to be the position throughout the country. In such circumstances it will be a neutral factor when considering whether it is reasonable for him to move from the place where persecution is feared to the safe haven.
49
In short a human rights interpretation of the IPA requiring the protection of 'basic civil, political, and socio-economic rights', although desirable, suffers from numerous inherent difficulties. It is therefore submitted that this standard is not applicable in the IPA inquiry and we must look elsewhere when ascertaining the relevant benchmark in terms of human rights considerations (if any) when assessing the existence of an IPA.
The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 50
The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement have also been advocated as a potential yardstick by which human rights conditions within a proposed IPA could be measured. The use of the Guiding Principles to determine the adequacy of human rights protection in a proposed IPA suffers from many of the same shortcomings as the 'core'
human rights approach outlined above. Another problem with using the Guiding Principles as a benchmark for IPA determination is that the protections set out in the Guiding Principles protection in the country of nationality, and the international 'protection' which accrues when the refugee is in the asylum state, as set out in articles 2-33. Only the former concept of 'protection' is relevant to the IPA inquiry. This is highlighted by the fact that articles 2-33 make no reference to protection from persecution, which should form the core of the IPA analysis. In addition, the Refugee Convention is not aimed at the 'general levelling up of living standards around the world, desirable though of course that is.' 70 Refugees and those displaced internally are fundamentally different, in that the international community's access to IDPs can be limited or qualified. This is not the case with refugees. 71 Furthermore, the rights that are set out in the Convention accrue to a person after they have satisfied the criteria of the refugee definition. To treat those rights as a standard which forms part of the refugee definition would be premature and would possibly entail extending the reach of the refugee definition beyond that which was envisaged by its drafters. As previously outlined, the travaux préparatoires show that it was the intent of the drafters that persons displaced within their countries of origin were not to be protected by the Refugee Convention. The
Refugee Convention cannot therefore be used as a backdoor to provide international protection for those displaced internally.
Further, to treat articles 2-33 as part of the refugee definition would mean that the inquiry into IPA is 'really an inquiry into whether a person who is prima facie a refugee ... suggest that so long as the state treats the refugee in the IPA equally with respect to the narrow range of rights in the Convention, protection would be satisfied even if a greater range of rights were accorded to the refugee's fellow citizens. In effect the state protection requirement would be met even when the refugee is denied core entitlements available to other citizens provided they are also denied to non-citizens.
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The second reason is a practical one, in that the rights which are set out in the Refugee Convention are not applicable in an internal context. It is true that the Michigan Guidelines '[do] not suggest a literal interpretation of Articles 2-33 in considering internal protection, but rather that decision makers seek inspiration from the kind of interests protected by these Articles.' Even if the Guidelines are employed in this very general manner, it nonetheless would entail reading into the Convention a standard which has clearly been set for persons in a different legal and factual scenario and thus has a different conceptual basis. While refugees and IDPs often have similar protection needs, the situation of persons who have crossed an international frontier is different from that of persons who are obliged to relocate within their country of origin to receive protection. As noted by Barutciski, refugees are granted basic socio-economic rights for the purposes of maintaining themselves in a foreign country in which they do not have citizenship status. 75 It would not make sense to look to these rights for guidance when considering the situation of citizens in their country of origin. Moreover, there are various levels at which the relevant rights are required to be conferred. 76 In the case of some rights, refugees must be treated in the same manners of nationals of the country of asylum (e.g articles 4 and 14). Some rights entail a duty to afford refugees the 'most favourable treatment accorded to nationals of another country in the same circumstances' (for example, articles 15, 17). Others must be granted in a manner at least as favourable as conditions granted to other aliens generally (for example, articles 7 and 13). This may be contrasted with the right of IDPs under the Guiding Principles to 'enjoy, in full equality, the same rights and freedoms under international and domestic law as do other persons in their country.' 77 The fact that these rights are granted relative to the situation in the asylum state makes it difficult to accept that such a specific standard can be used as general guidelines to assess the situation in a country of origin. Thirdly, it is important to remember, as Marx points out, that there is no obligation on parties to the Convention to abstain from deportation if the conditions in the IPA fall below the protection standard set out in the Convention. 79 Where a person satisfies the refugee definition, the state is bound by article 32, which prohibits the expulsion of a refugee lawfully within its territory save on the grounds of national security and public order. The state is also bound by the principle of non-refoulement, as laid down in article 33, which prohibits the return of refugees to places where their lives or freedoms are endangered on Convention grounds. As the Convention explicitly sets out the exceptions to the general right of states to deport aliens within their territory, the argument that another unenumerated exception exists is difficult to maintain.
Finally, the legal weight of the Guidelines must be borne in mind when assessing their authoritative value. As mentioned previously, the Guidelines were drafted by a team of academics led by Professor Hathaway. Such academic writings are not referred to as authoritative by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 80 According to the 1945
Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) however, 'teachings of the most highly qualified publicists' may be applied by the court as 'a subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law'. 81 Considering that the ICJ is the body to which disputes concerning the Refugee Convention are to be referred to, it is possible that the Michigan Guidelines could be considered in that context. Furthermore, the publications of eminent scholars are frequently cited by domestic asylum determination bodies.
The problem with the Michigan Guidelines as an authoritative interpretation of international law, however, is the sources upon which they are based. Their drafters maintain that they are 'the product of collective study of relevant norms' and that they 'informed 
The Approach in England and Wales
The Michigan Guidelines/ New Zealand approach was rejected by practice based on opino juris and such consensus of professional and academic opinion as would be necessary to establish a rule of customary international law. 94 On this ground, it should be noted that it is unnecessary to establish a consensus of academic and professional opinion to establish the existence of a customary norm -the relevant criteria is the degree of state practice and opinio juris supporting the rule. 95 In There is a high level of deprivation and want. Respect for human rights is scant.
He escapes to a rich country where, if recognised as a refugee, he would enjoy all the rights guaranteed to refugees in that country. He could, with no fear of persecution, live elsewhere in his country of nationality, but would there suffer all the drawbacks of living in a poor and backward country. It would be strange if the accident of persecution were to entitle him to escape, not only from that persecution, but from the deprivation to which his home country is subject. It would, of course, be different if the lack of respect for human rights posed threats to his life or exposed him to the risk of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
This point was confirmed by Baroness Hale in Secretary of State for the Home
Department v AH (Sudan) and others (FC) [2007]:
If people can return to live a life which is normal in that context, and free from the well-founded fear of persecution, they cannot take advantage of past persecution to achieve a better life in the country to which they have fled.
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The thrust of this point is that the application of the Michigan Guidelines rule to the IPA would expand the applicability net of the Refugee Convention far beyond that was anticipated by its drafters and that this result would be too far removed from the purposes of the Convention. According to Januzi, if the issue of an IPA is raised, the relevant comparison would be between conditions in the place of relocation and those which prevailed elsewhere in the country of nationality.
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By contrast, a comparison between the asylum seeker's circumstances in the receiving country with the place of relocation was not relevant, though it could be relevant within the framework of complementary protection. Thus humanitarian considerations (persecution apart) did not form part of the IPA inquiry for the purposes of the refugee definition, but such considerations fell within the realm of other conventions.
The logic of this conclusion is best illustrated by direct application to the facts of the case:
the first applicant, Mr. Januzi, was resisting expulsion not because of fear of persecution in Pristina, but because for medical reasons, it would be unduly harsh for him to relocate there.
If he were to succeed on the basis of the Refugee Convention, he would be a refugee for socioeconomic reasons, rather than for a well-founded fear of persecution, and thus in refusing his refugee status, this case seemed to reflect a desire to maintain the distinction between refugee and humanitarian claims. That said, human rights considerations did influence this decision in three respects. First, Lord Bingham acknowledged that the Refugee Convention, as a human rights convention, should not be given a narrow meaning, although he qualified this statement by referring to the obligation not to allow an interpretation grounded in human rights considerations to override the textual meaning of the Convention. 
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Thus what we are left with in Januzi is a somewhat curious conclusion. On the one hand, Lord Bingham is clear in his assertion that human rights considerations (persecution apart) do not form part of the IPA inquiry but are more appropriately addressed by the framework of complementary protection. On the other hand, the importance of basic human rights, in particular non-derogable rights, in determining the reasonableness of a proposed IPA is indirectly endorsed by reference to the UNHCR guidelines. The logic behind this reference to the UNHCR's undefined standard is unclear, particularly when earlier in the judgment Lord
Bingham placed emphasis on employing a textual interpretation of the Refugee Convention and insisted that the parties are 'not to be treated as having agreed something they did not agree'. 104 In addition, as stated by Mathew, the prioritisation of non-derogable rights is arbitrary, as the classification of a right as non-derogable does not indicate higher importance, but rather that the rights are given special treatment during a public emergency threatening the life of the nation. 105 Further, the inclusion of non-derogable rights may result in further confusion about the role of complementary protection vis a vis refugee law, considering that complementary protection is based on key non-derogable human rights such as the prohibition of torture.
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The confusing nature of this decision could perhaps be attributed to the fact that Lord
Bingham focused his discussion on the reasonableness of the IPA rather than the protection available in the proposed location. 107 5. A different approach: 'Reasonableness' and 'Protection' combined?
As the above discussion illustrates, there is no clearly defined, accepted approach regarding the relevance of human rights considerations in the IPA inquiry. This stems largely from the fact that there is no reference to human rights in the refugee definition, and because it is unclear whether the primary aim of the Refugee Convention is to protect the human rights of refugees, or whether it has the more narrow, state-centric purpose of protecting only those who have a well-founded fear of persecution on Convention grounds. As outlined above, however, the Refugee Convention's preamble and subsequent interpretation by states indicate that it cannot be construed entirely independently of human rights considerations.
State practice to date has shown a divergence in positions between the Michigan Guidelines/ New Zealand approach, and the jurisprudence of England and Wales. Although both positions stem from the premise that general human rights considerations do not play a part in the IPA inquiry, they differ as to the relevance of the 'reasonableness' standard. Rather than employ the 'reasonableness' approach, the 'Michigan Guidelines/ New Zealand' approach puts forward a standard based on the rights which accrue to refugees recognized as such. The 'Januzi' approach, on the other hand, accepts the 'reasonableness' standard and rejects the Michigan Guidelines for numerous reasons, holding that human rights considerations (persecution aside) do not generally play a part in the IPA inquiry, while at the same time indirectly endorsing the UNHCR's position that basic human rights standards, nonderogable rights in particular, are relevant to the reasonableness inquiry.
Where then does that then leave the IPA inquiry? And can either or both of these positions be reconciled with the Refugee Convention? It is submitted that primary recourse should be had to the Refugee Convention itself, and in particular to the prohibition of non-refoulement and the refugee definition, when determining the relevance of human rights standards in the IPA inquiry.
States are bound by the principle of non-refoulement, as laid down in article 33, which prohibits the return of refugees to territories where their lives or freedoms are endangered on Convention grounds. Refugee status is declaratory in nature, which means that a person does not become a refugee because of recognition as such; rather, refugee status is recognised because the person is a refugee. 116 As asylum seekers may be refugees, the principle of nonrefoulement also applies to them and thus they should not be returned or expelled pending a final determination of status.
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Article 33 is one of just two provisions in the Refugee Convention that limits the power of states to expel aliens and thus it is logical to have recourse to article 33 when determining whether an asylum seeker may be sent to an IPA. As article 33 applies to asylum seekers, it arguably expresses a general principle of protection which can and should be factored into the IPA inquiry. In employing article 33 in this manner, the question of 'reasonableness' is really an inquiry as to whether it is reasonable to expect the asylum seeker to remain in the IPA, or whether the conditions there are such as to compel return to a location where he will be exposed to persecution and thus constitute indirect refoulement. In this sense, the focus is anchored in the text of the Convention, and thus has a sounder basis in international law.
Secondly, a core element of the refugee definition is that the asylum seeker is unable to obtain protection from the persecution feared. This is the only qualifying condition concerning standards prevailing in the country of origin referred to in the refugee definition. Therefore in order for an IPA to exist, it must be illustrated that there exists 'protection' in the place of relocation. This may seem somewhat obvious, given that IPA refers to an internal 'protection' alternative but one should bear in mind that this term provides the crucial nexus between the requirements of the IPA and the requirements of the refugee definition. This approach is attractive as it maintains the distinction between refugee and humanitarian claims and it is firmly based in the text of the Refugee Convention. Human rights considerations only enter the IPA inquiry where relevant to a state's obligations under the Refugee Convention. For this reason, only those who fit the refugee definition will be able to invoke the Refugee Convention to preclude expulsion and it will not be possible to invoke the Refugee Convention to provide international protection for so-called 'economic refugees'. Those who do not fit the refugee definition will nonetheless have an alternative avenue of redress under complementary protection. The benefit of using complementary protection as a benchmark is that reliance will be placed on international treaties and established international jurisprudence, rather than on the vague and undefined 'core human rights approach' which has been put forward by the UNHCR. Finally, this approach provides
